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THE CANADIAN AUTO WORKERS-MAGNA INTERNATIONAL, 
INC. FRAMEWORK OF FAIRNESS AGREEMENT: 
A U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
MARTIN H. MALIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 15, 2007, the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) and Magna 
International, Inc. (Magna) entered into a historic agreement entitled, 
“Framework of Fairness Agreement” (FFA).1 The FFA “went further than any 
other Canadian neutrality agreement in terms of the organizing benefits it 
conferred on the CAW,”2 creating what York University Professor David 
Doorey has called “a remarkable scenario for CAW organizers, completely at 
odds with the environment they would be used to operating under in almost 
every other organizing campaign.”3  Nevertheless, the FFA has been extremely 
controversial among unions and their supporters in Canada.  Although 
approved by the CAW Council on December 7, 2007,4 there was significant 
dissent within the union’s ranks.5 The Ontario Federation of Labour, of which 
 
* Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
Illinois Institute of Technology.  I wish to acknowledge excellent research assistance from Tracy 
Scholnick Gruber, Chicago-Kent College of Law class of 2009, helpful comments from Susan A. 
FitzGibbon, Cesar Rosado Marzán, and Richard Warner, and financial support from the Marshall-
Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent. 
 1. See generally Framework of Fairness Agreement Between: Magna International, Inc. and 
National, Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers of Canada (CAW-Can.) 
(Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.caw.ca/en/3642.htm (last visited Feb 15, 2010) [hereinafter FFA]. 
 2. David J. Doorey, Six Questions About Neutrality Agreements (And Some Answers) 1 
(Apr. 15, 2009) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1380342. 
 3.  Id. 
 4. See Press Release, Transportation and General Workers of Canada, CAW Council 
Overwhelmingly Endorses Magna Framework of Fairness (Dec. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.caw.ca/en/3552.htm; Tony Van Alphen, CAW Membership Formally Approves ‘No 
Strike’ Pact, THESTAR.COM, Dec. 8, 2007, http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/283706. 
 5. See, e.g., Van Alphen, supra note 4; Tony Van Alphen, Critics Fume over Magna Deal, 
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 17, 2007 at B2; Tony Van Alphen, Key CAW Leader Opposes Magna 
Deal, WHEELS.CA, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.wheels.ca/printArticle/32508; Jeff Casey, 
CAW/Magna Framework of Fairness Agreement, 14 RUBBER REPORT (CAW-TCA Canada 
newsletter), Winter 2007, at 2, available at http://www.cawlocal.ca/4451/newsletters.asp# 
(newsletter of CAW Local 4451 arguing against the FFA); The Magna Charter Dilemma, 
NEWSLETTER (CAW TCA Local 2200), Nov. 27, 2007, at 23, available at http://www.caw 
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the CAW is not a member, voted to condemn the FFA.6 Commentators 
suggested that the FFA violated the Code of Ethical Practices in the Canadian 
Labour Congress Constitution,7 and sacrificed “the very cornerstones upon 
which the Canadian trade-union movement is built.”8 
In this Article, I analyze the FFA from the perspective of United States 
labor law and use the analysis as a vehicle for examining the ongoing 
controversy in the United States concerning neutrality and voluntary 
recognition agreements.  In Part I, I review the FFA, its history and 
background, and the controversy in Canada.  In Part II, I discuss why the FFA 
would be illegal in the United States.  In Part III, I use that discussion as a 
vehicle for examining the controversy over neutrality and card check 
agreements in the United States and suggest guidelines for evaluating their 
legality. 
I.  THE FRAMEWORK OF FAIRNESS AGREEMENT 
A. The Parties 
Magna International began in 1957 as a small tool and die shop in 
Toronto.9 It grew to be the largest employer in the Canadian automotive 
industry with 18,000 hourly production employees at forty-five facilities.10  
Worldwide, it operates 200 plants with 84,000 employees.11 It has ambitions to 
become an auto assembler as well.  When Daimler sought to divest itself of its 
Chrysler operations, Magna was one of the unsuccessful bidders.12  When 
General Motors sought to sell its Opel Division, Magna was one of the 
 
2200.ca/Files/Newsletter/2007/Nov%2007%20Newsletter.pdf (reporting unanimous membership 
vote to oppose FFA). 
 6. See Ian Urquhart, Labour Condemns CAW Deal, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 27, 2007, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/article/280100. 
 7. Geoff Bickerton, Magna-CAW Framework of Fairness Agreement is an Affront to Union 
Democracy, BULLET (E-Bulletin No. 67, The Socialist Project), Oct. 24, 2007, 
http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/bullet067.html. 
 8. Editorial, The Magna Agreement: Not the Way Forward, CANADIAN DIMENSION, 
Jan./Feb. 2008, at 4. 
 9. Wayne Lewchuk & Don Wells, Transforming Worker Representation: The Magna 
Model in Canada and Mexico, LABOUR/LE TREVAIL, Fall 2007, at 108 [hereinafter Lewchuk & 
Wells, Transforming Worker Representation]. 
 10. CAW & Magna: A Window of Opportunity (December 2007) at 11, available at 
www.caw.ca/en/3651.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (on file with the Saint Louis University Law 
Journal) (PowerPoint presentation on FFA by CAW leadership to the CAW Council) [hereinafter 
CAW FFA PowerPoint]. 
 11. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 109. 
 12. See National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of 
Canada (CAW-Canada), CAW-Magna Timeline, http://www.caw.ca/en/3641.htm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2010). 
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bidders.13 Magna’s growth may be attributed in part to the strategy of General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler in the 1980s to reduce their labor costs by 
outsourcing the fabrication of parts and other components.14  Its production 
workers’ wage scale was about 40% below the wage scales of the Detroit 
Three—allowing Magna to produce parts and components at a lower cost.15  It 
spread its workforce among numerous small plants that it tended to locate on 
the fringes of urban areas.16 
Magna has drawn its workforce largely from people who previously 
worked “at farms, restaurants, . . . convenience stores,” and similar employers 
who paid much lower wages than Magna and offered even fewer benefits, 
including a large number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and 
Asia.17 Consequently, Magna’s workers have tended to compare their 
compensation not to that paid at unionized automotive plants, but to what they 
received in their former jobs.18  Magna has been able to pay skilled and 
professional workers, such as engineers, lower wages than the automakers by 
hiring immigrants who lack the American credentials likely to be found among 
comparable employees at the Detroit Three, as well as by providing training 
and promotion from within the organization.19  It also has relied, to a large 
extent, on existing employees to refer new hires, particularly family 
members.20 
New hires enter as temporary employees and are paid less than permanent 
employees.21  They have no set probationary period and become permanent 
employees at management’s discretion.22  The temporary employees provide a 
buffer that protects permanent employees against layoffs23 and provide another 
 
 13. See Joint Press Release, Magna International, Inc. and Savings Bank of the Russian 
Federation, Magna and Sberbank Announce Revised Offer for Opel (July 21, 2009), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTA2MDh8Q2hpbGRJRD0t 
MXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1. 
 14. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 109. 
 15. Id. at 112. This comparison does not take into account the recent wage and benefit 
concessions that the CAW and its United States counterpart, the International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) have agreed to 
with General Motors and Chrysler. 
 16. Id. at 113. 
 17. Id. at 121; Wayne Lewchuk & Don Wells, When Corporations Substitute for Adversarial 
Unions: Labour Markets and Human Resource Management at Magna, 61 RELATIONS 
INDUSTRIELLES/INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 639, 655 (2006) [hereinafter Lewchuk & Wells, When 
Corporations Substitute]. 
 18. Lewchuk & Wells, When Corporations Substitute, supra note 17, at 651. 
 19. Id. at 655. 
 20. Id. at 654–55. 
 21. Id. at 651. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 116. 
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basis of comparison that reinforces permanent employee satisfaction with their 
wages and benefits.24 
Seniority plays a very minor role at Magna.  Instead, management enjoys 
much more discretion than in unionized facilities, and advancement is based on 
performance and cooperative attitude.25  Workers rely on their relationships 
with supervisors to pave the way for advancement or favorable treatment, such 
as approval of vacation schedules and the hiring of family members and 
friends.26  “To be successful, workers need to adhere to an unwritten code of 
conduct regarding their work ethic and acceptance of corporate goals.”27 
Annual wage increases are set unilaterally by management and tied closely 
to firm profitability.  Distribution of wage increases depends on employees’ 
evaluations.  The evaluations center not only on performance criteria such as 
productivity and attendance, but also on criteria tied to worker cooperation 
with management.  Employees who are judged substandard receive only half 
of the wage increase until they improve and meet performance criteria.28 
Magna also distributes 10% of its pre-tax profits to its employees.  The 
money is invested in Magna stock and held in trust in individual employee 
accounts.  Employees may not withdraw assets from their accounts for at least 
ten years.29 
Each of Magna’s small plants is semi-autonomous.  A plant, or a small 
network of plants, is responsible for bringing in enough contracts to justify 
maintaining operations.30 At daily line meetings, weekly department meetings, 
and monthly plant meetings, supervisors and managers report on worker 
productivity and on how the plant is doing competitively.31  This results in a 
“workplace and corporate-centered model of cohesion in which workers look 
to management rather than to class-based organizations such as unions . . . to 
provide a ‘haven in a heartless world.’”32 
This approach appears to undermine worker solidarity.  For example, 
injured workers, 
[r]ather than receiving the support of co-workers . . . are more likely to be 
viewed as faking injuries and violating the implicit bargain of high effort 
norms. . . . Co-workers, dependent on management honouring the implicit non-
contractual labour bargain, fear associating too closely with workers who have 
 
 24. See id. at 121. 
 25. Id. at 116. 
 26. Id. at 115; Lewchuk & Wells, When Corporations Substitute, supra note 17, at 646. 
 27. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 115. 
 28. Id. at 117. 
 29. Id. at 117–18. 
 30. Id. at 113. 
 31. Lewchuk & Wells, When Corporations Substitute, supra note 17, at 647. 
 32. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 113. 
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fallen out of management favour and who have become a drag on overall 
company success and profits.33 
Magna maintains a “Concerns Resolution Process,” which features an 
“Open Door Policy,” under which employees are encouraged to view their 
concerns as individual problems to be worked out informally with supervision, 
rather than formally pursued collective grievances.34  If problems are not 
resolved within forty-eight hours, however, a human resources manager 
intervenes.35  Each plant employs an employee advocate (EA), an hourly 
employee selected by management whose continued functioning in office is 
subject to periodic ratification by majority vote of the EA’s peers.36  Despite 
the name, the EA’s role is to guide employees in disputes but “not to 
represent” them.37 A Fairness Committee (FC) consists of managers and 
employee representatives elected by the workers.38  Employees may take 
matters to the committee and committee members may accompany employees 
to meetings with management, but, like the EA, they do not serve as 
representatives.39  Workers may also appeal to the corporate level by using an 
employee hotline.40  Most issues, however, are resolved with direct supervision 
at the work group level.41 
Magna’s methods of hiring and rewarding employees and resolving 
employee grievances strongly encourage workers to internalize corporate 
values and bond with management, while hampering class-based worker 
solidarity.  Organizing employees at Magna would present a challenge for any 
union. 
In 1936, the UAW organized its first Canadian local at the Kelsey Wheel 
Windsor, Ontario auto parts plant.42  In 1985, all of the Canadian UAW locals 
split off from their parent union and formed the CAW.43  For decades, first the 
UAW, and then the CAW, attempted to organize workers at Magna with 
extremely limited success.  In the early part of the new century, the CAW 
succeeded in organizing about 1000 Magna workers from three plants: 
 
 33. Id. at 115. 
 34. Id. at 114; FFA, supra note 1, at 5. 
 35. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 114. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Lewchuk & Wells, Transforming Worker Representation, supra note 9, at 114. 
 41. Id. at 114–15. 
 42. CAW-Magna Timeline, supra note 12. 
 43. Id. 
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Integram Windsor, Mississauga Seating, and Innovatech Windsor.  In doing so, 
the CAW was assisted by pressure on Magna from the Detroit Three.44 
B. The Framework of Fairness Agreement (FFA) 
Negotiations between the CAW and Magna that culminated in the FFA 
began in 2005.45  The FFA declared the parties’ joint goals “of not only 
preserving but expanding Canada’s automotive sector through high-
performance work practices; investments in both capital and human resources; 
effective and just labour relations; world-class quality, productivity, and 
reliability; developing and renewing top-quality skilled trades; and continuing 
to support and enhance social and environmental sustainability.”46 
Under the FFA, Magna commits to investing in new products and 
processes; operating efficiently; treating employees fairly; providing 
employees with training; “maintaining health, safety and environmental 
practices . . . ;” having employees share in the company’s financial successes; 
communicating regularly to employees; and generating a competitive return for 
shareholders.47  The CAW commits to serving as a check and balance for 
employees within the Magna system; assisting Magna in sourcing; building 
employee morale; enhancing employee cooperation and commitment; 
facilitating relationships with customers; enhancing transparency and 
credibility in existing Magna labour relations processes; providing professional 
expertise, particularly with respect to health and safety, wellness, and 
employee assistance programs; assisting with apprenticeship programs; 
assisting in achieving racial and gender equality; obtaining better rates for 
products and services; and partnering on legislative and community projects.48 
The FFA contains a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning the 
union recognition process.  Under the MOA, Magna provides the CAW with a 
list of all employees in a prospective bargaining unit within one week of a 
CAW request and updates the list monthly.  The union gives the company 
notice of its intent to conduct an election at a particular division.  Once an 
election date is scheduled, Magna allows CAW organizers to meet with 
employees on Magna property during nonworking time in nonworking areas 
for a period of seven days. Immediately prior to the election, Magna provides 
the CAW access to the employees in a meeting called during work time.  At 
the meeting, Magna introduces the union, advises the employees that the two 
 
 44. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 13; Tony Van Alphen, CAW Shelves Right to 
Strike: Magna and Auto Workers Aim to Build a New Management-Union Relationship, 
THESTAR.COM, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.thestar.com/article/267140. 
 45. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 13. 
 46. FFA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. Id. at 3–4. 
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parties have a positive relationship and that they have a national collective 
bargaining agreement, which commits both parties to the facility’s success and 
growth.  Both parties affirm their support for the FFA and the national 
collective bargaining agreement.49 
Immediately following the meeting, a mutually agreed upon “election 
neutral” conducts a secret ballot election which simultaneously asks for 
acceptance of the CAW as exclusive bargaining representative and ratification 
of the national collective bargaining agreement.  The national collective 
bargaining agreement is deemed ratified, and the CAW is recognized as the 
exclusive bargaining representative if a majority of employees who vote 
approve the agreement.50 
As indicated above, under the FFA, the CAW commits to serving as a 
check and balance for employees within the Magna system.51 Consequently, 
the FFA does not provide for a typical system of shop stewards and local 
officers.  Instead, it integrates the CAW into the existing Magna human 
resources system.52 
The FFA continues the Magna system of Fairness Committees (FC). An 
FC is established for each division with members elected from each 
department or work area and shift.  The FFA declares the FC’s purpose as “a 
resource in the Concern Resolution Process in each facility and to work to 
build a positive and productive work environment within their Division.”53  
The FFA adds that FC members “are not union representatives nor does their 
role include the representation of employees.”54 A majority of FC members are 
elected by the bargaining unit, with the remainder appointed by management.55 
A secret ballot vote of the employees selects bargaining unit FC 
members.56  To be eligible to serve, an employee must not be on probation, 
must have a “[g]ood disciplinary record,” “must be able to communicate 
effectively,” and must “[commit] to the principles of the Magna Employees’ 
Charter, the FFA and the National [Collective Bargaining] Agreement.”57  FC 
members serve staggered three-year terms.58 
The FFA does not provide for traditional shop stewards.  Instead, it 
continues the Magna position of Employee Advocate.  The EA’s duties include 
providing “support” to employees in the lower stages of the Concern 
 
 49. Id. at 21–22. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 52. FFA, supra note 1, at 5. 
 53. Id. at 10. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 10, 16. 
 56. Id. at 16. 
 57. FFA, supra note 1, at 16. 
 58. Id. 
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Resolution Process up through appeals to Magna’s hotline.  Appeals beyond 
the hotline are subject to the EA’s control, and the EA, rather than the 
employee, pursues the matter on behalf of the employee.59  This appears to be 
a significant modification of the Magna policy in its non-union facilities, 
where the EA is not regarded as representing the employees.60 
EAs must have at least three years’ seniority.61  Applicants for EA 
positions are evaluated by the facilities’ Fairness Committees, which rank the 
top three applicants.62  The CAW Assistant to the President (CAW AP) selects 
one of the top three candidates to be the EA.63  Once selected, EAs remain in 
office until removed by a vote of a majority of bargaining unit employees.64  
The initial vote is held eighteen months following the EA’s selection with 
subsequent votes held every thirty-six months.65 
The FFA establishes an Employee Relations Review Committee (ERRC).  
The ERRC consists of the CAW AP, the CAW National Representative 
assigned to the Magna local, the Magna local President, and two representative 
of Magna’s Executive Vice President for Global Human Resources “and one 
Senior Operating Executive.”66  In addition to holding quarterly meetings that 
in other contexts would be thought of as labor-management committee 
meetings,67 the ERRC serves as the lead committee negotiating the national 
collective bargaining agreement,68 and as the final internal step in the Concerns 
Resolution Process.69 
Under the FFA, all bargaining units at all Magna FFA facilities constitute a 
single amalgamated CAW local.70  The EAs form the executive committee of 
the amalgamated local and elect members of the committee to serve as the 
local’s officers.71 
Unlike the overwhelming majority of collective bargaining agreements, 
which have formal grievance procedures in which employees or the union 
pursue grievances that require responses by management followed by appeals 
to, and responses from, successively higher management officials—the FFA 
retains, with some modifications, Magna’s existing Concern Resolution 
 
 59. FFA, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 60. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 61. FFA, supra note 1, at 18. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. FFA, supra note 1, at 6. 
 67. Id. at 6–7. 
 68. Id. at 7. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 6. 
 71. FFA, supra note 1, at 6. 
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Process.  Indeed, the term “grievance” does not appear in the FFA. This 
appears to be in keeping with Magna’s human resources policy that regards 
“grievances” as individual problems to be resolved at the most local level 
possible.72 
The FFA encourages employees to raise concerns or complaints with their 
immediate supervisors but provides that they may use Magna’s Open Door 
Process to raise the matter with the supervisor, an FC member, the department 
manager, the human resources department, the assistant general manager, the 
general manager, or the Joint Health and Safety Committee.73  Issues not 
resolved through the informal process may be referred to the FC, which has 
authority to apply the national collective bargaining agreement, except for 
termination cases or pay and benefit rates matters.74 
 Employees may appeal to the Magna Hotline for corporate level review of 
the FC decision, or they may bypass the local level entirely and begin their 
complaint at the hotline level.75  All termination cases must originate at the 
hotline level.76  Appeals beyond the hotline level are controlled by the EA.77 
The next level of appeal is the Concern Resolution Subcommittee of the ERRC 
(CRSC).78  The CRSC consists of the EA and a representative from the CAW 
AP, the Group Human Resources Director, and the facility General Manager or 
his or her designee.79  The CRSC meets monthly and is to decide appeals 
within forty-eight hours of the meeting.80  If it is unable to resolve a case, the 
CAW AP or the Division General Manager may appeal the matter within ten 
days to the ERRC.81  If the employee or division management is not satisfied 
with the ERRC’s resolution, either the CAW AP or the Magna Executive Vice 
President may appeal the matter to a neutral arbitrator.82 
 Negotiations for a new national agreement commence within fifteen days 
of a notice by either party of its desire to bargain.83  The notice must be served 
within ninety days of the existing agreement’s expiration date.84  If agreement 
cannot be reached or a tentative agreement does not win ratification from the 
executive council of the amalgamated local or the members of the local, the 
 
 72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 73. FFA, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. Id. at 11. 
 76. Id. at 10. 
 77. Id. 
 78. FFA, supra note 1, at 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 12. 
 83. FFA, supra note 1, at 24. 
 84. Id. at 19. 
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dispute is referred to arbitration.85  The FFA does not allow for a resort to 
economic weapons such as strikes or lockouts.86  The FFA expressly provides 
that the national agreement will reflect, among other things, that each division 
is a separate profit center with its future dependent on maintaining “an 
acceptable return on investment.”87  Thus, the FFA leaves intact a key Magna 
practice that has led employees to identify with their local facility and its 
management rather than build class-based solidarity with coworkers company 
wide. 
C. The Controversy in Canada 
The FFA ignited a fierce debate within the labor movement in Canada.  
The primary rationale advanced by the CAW for the FFA was the need to 
arrest the spiraling decline in union density in Canada—in the private sector 
generally and in the automotive industry in particular.  The CAW observed that 
union density in the Canadian private sector fell from over 30% in the 1970s to 
17% in 2006.88  Noting the steeper decline in the United States, the CAW 
cautioned, “We’re at a turning point now in Canada.  We can follow the U.S. 
path.  It will take us a little longer.  But we are clearly heading the same way.  
Or we can turn it around.  That’s our choice.”89 
Turning to the automotive industry, the CAW noted that union density 
among auto assemblers in Canada was 100% until the late 1980s, but had since 
declined to approximately 70%.90  Nevertheless, the union asserted that it was 
still able to control wages and working conditions across that sector.91  But in 
the auto parts sector, the CAW maintained, its density was declining more 
steeply and approaching 25%.92  Again drawing on the experience in the 
United States, the CAW warned that if the trend was not reversed, its ability to 
maintain wages and working conditions even at unionized facilities would be 
threatened.93  With Magna representing 25% of the auto parts sector in Canada, 
the CAW urged organizing its workforce under the FFA would bring union 
density back to a level that would restore CAW control over labor standards 
industry wide.94 
 
 85. Id. at 24. 
 86. Id. at 15. 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 3. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 5. 
 91. Id. at 7. 
 92. Id. 
 93. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 7. 
 94. Id. at 11. 
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Critics charge that the FFA represents: 
a radical break from many of the union’s basic principles: it gave up the right 
to strike; it proposed a model of organizing new members that essentially 
relied on the good will of the employer, rather than the power and potential of 
the union; it argued for a structure of workplace union representation that was 
not independent of management, giving up the right to an independent, elected, 
shop-floor set of union representatives . . . .95 
The University of Toronto’s Center for Industrial Relations and Human 
Resources devoted its 2008 annual Sefton Lecture to a debate on the FFA by 
McMaster University Labour Studies Professor Charlotte A. B. Yates and 
CAW Economist Jim Stanford.96  Yates criticized the FFA for permanently 
giving up the right to strike.97  She offered two grounds for her criticism.  First, 
she argued, that the right to strike is a human right rather than a commodity 
and, therefore, is not to be traded off permanently.98  Second, while agreeing 
that the number of strikes had decreased greatly, she nevertheless maintained 
that, in appropriate circumstances, the strike or the threat of strike could still be 
a powerful motivator for employer concessions.99 
Yates maintained that continued divisions within the labor movement in 
Canada pose an impediment to reversing the decline in union density.100  She 
characterized the FFA as “driv[ing] a further wedge” in the movement.101 
Yates criticized the FFA’s provisions for selecting union representatives 
because they give central union administration, and potentially management, 
influence over the process.102  She argued that this approach weakens 
representatives’ networks and independence.103  She criticized the CAW for 
building on Magna’s existing non-union system.104 
 
 95. Posting of Herman Rosenfeld to Doorey’s Workplace Law Blogs, http://www.yorku.ca/ 
ddoorey/lawblog/?p=730 (Feb. 4, 2009) (comments of retired CAW National Representative 
Herman Rosenfeld). 
 96. Charlotte A.B. Yates & Jim Stanford, University of Toronto Sefton Memorial Lecture, 
New Union Strategies for Tough Times: The CAW-Magna Deal, and other Responses (Mar. 27, 
2008) (transcript available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/cir/library/seftonlectures/sefton 
lectures.html); McMaster University Faculty Profile—Charlotte Yates, http://www.socsci. 
mcmaster.ca/polisci/Webpages/Staff/charoletteyates.html. 
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Yates also expressed concern over the FFA’s language.  She criticized the 
use of “corporate competitiveness.”105  She also highlighted the FFA’s 
references to “‘concerns’” and “‘employees’” rather than grievances and 
workers.106  She urged, “[L]anguage is so very important as it reflects what and 
who we are, but also shapes the terms and conditions under which we relate to 
and include others in our lives.”107 
Stanford defended the FFA.  He positioned the FFA as a strategy to deal 
with decreasing union density, which he characterized as “a threat to the 
survival of our movement and a threat to the fundamental nature of Canadian 
society.”108  He maintained that the CAW negotiated the FFA from a position 
of strength derived from its successful organization at the three Magna plants, 
and that the CAW extracted many concessions from Magna in the 
negotiations.109  He characterized the FFA as a “significant step forward,” 
observing that it gave Magna workers a full-time union representative, a three-
year cycle for negotiating new contracts, full arbitration if negotiations do not 
produce agreement, ratification by secret ballot, and national representation 
from the union.110 
Stanford characterized the selection of the EA as “indirect,” but maintained 
that such an approach was not unprecedented.111  He asserted with respect to 
the EA, “At the end of the day, the rep will be a union activist with a mandate 
from his constituency.”112 
Stanford defended the FFA’s substitution of arbitration for the right to 
strike over impasses in contract negotiations.  He relied on data from the 
Ontario Labour Relations Board which showed that there had been 125 
voluntary agreements to substitute arbitration of contract terms for the right to 
strike in Ontario in the prior ten years and concluded that in this regard the 
FFA was “nothing new.”113  He maintained that arbitration could produce 
results superior to the right to strike, contrasting the contract negotiated under 
the FFA at Magna’s Windsor Modules plant with the contract negotiated with 
a strike at a nearby TRW plant.114 
 
 105. Yates & Stanford, supra note 96. 
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In contrast to Yates and others who criticized the FFA for undermining 
class-based solidarity, Stanford positioned the FFA as a necessary response to 
current market conditions where globalization leaves “less competitive space 
for individual companies or even groups of companies to pay higher wages to 
people and stay in business.”115  The challenge for unions, he maintained, is to 
organize workers while ensuring that their employers remain in business.116  If 
unions do not meet that challenge, workers will fear that unionization will lead 
to job loss and will not join.117 To meet that challenge, the FFA represents “a 
corporatist type of strategy by unions where when they do get in, they are 
going to do what they can to improve the conditions of their workers, but 
they’re also going to be looking at ways such as productivity growth, industrial 
policy measures and other factors to try and keep their employers in 
business.”118 
Perhaps because the CAW’s attention and resources have been diverted by 
the global economic meltdown, particularly the bankruptcies of Chrysler and 
General Motors, the first year and a half of the FFA has not produced much 
progress toward the CAW’s goal of organizing all Magna workers and 
restoring union density in the Canadian auto parts sector toward 50%.119  In 
November 2007, workers at Magna’s Windsor Modules plant voted for 
recognition under the FFA.120  The action generated considerable controversy 
as critics charged that the plant had already been or was on its way to being 
organized traditionally and did not have to give up the right to strike to gain 
recognition.121  In April 2008, workers at Magna’s Qualtech Seating Plant in 
London, Ontario, voted for CAW recognition under the FFA.122  In January 
2009, in an action that stirred almost as much controversy as the original FFA, 
workers at the Mississauga Seating Plant, one of the three plants that the CAW 
had organized prior to the FFA, voted, over the objection of their local 
president, to ratify the FFA.123 
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Perhaps because of the limited activity thus far under the FFA, there is no 
reported litigation challenging its legality.124  Professor Doorey has catalogued 
the issues the FFA raises under Canadian labor law, particularly the Ontario 
Labour Relations Act.125  The next section considers how the FFA would fare 
under United States law. 
II.  MAY UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS ADOPT THE FFA IN THE UNITED STATES? 
If the CAW is correct and Magna provides a method whereby Canadian 
labor can avoid following the path of organized labor in the United States, 
American unions may look to it as a model to reverse their decline.  Would 
such a model be lawful in the United States?  Two provisions of United States’ 
labor law would be implicated by an American version of the FFA: Title IV of 
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)126 and section 
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).127  Together these 
statutes envision employees who freely choose to be represented by labor 
organizations that are independent of their employers and that they control 
through democratic processes. 
A. Title IV of the LMRDA 
Enacted in 1959, the LMRDA was a reaction to revelations resulting from 
270 days of public hearings spread over two years conducted by the Senate 
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Fields, 
better known as the McClellan Committee, for its Chair, Senator John 
McClellan, Democratic senator from Arkansas.128  The Committee uncovered 
corruption and mob domination of labor unions and linked such malfeasance to 
antidemocratic practices it found in the same unions.129  It opined that 
revitalizing union democracy would “substantially improve[]” the conduct of 
union officials.130 
 
 124. Doorey, supra note 2. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481–83 (2006). 
 127. Id. §§151–69.  Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act prohibits an 
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Congress’ rationale for requiring democratic elections went beyond 
establishing a safeguard against corruption. Congress regarded workers’ 
democratic participation in the selection of those individuals empowered to 
represent them as a fundamental right of American union members.131  The 
House and Senate Committees expressed this sentiment almost identically: 
 It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic 
union elections.  Under the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts 
the union which is the bargaining representative has power, in conjunction 
with the employer, to fix a man’s wages, hours, and conditions of employment.  
The individual employee may not lawfully negotiate with his employer.  He is 
bound by the union contract.  In practice, the union also has a significant role 
in enforcing the grievance procedure where a man’s contract rights are 
enforced.  The Government which gives unions this power has an obligation to 
insure that the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men 
and women whom they represent. . . .  [T]he best assurance which can be given 
is a legal guaranty of free and periodic elections.132 
Section 401(b) of the LMRDA requires every local labor organization to 
elect its officers at least once every three years by secret ballot of its 
membership.133  The statute requires international labor organizations to elect 
their officers at least once every five years and intermediate bodies to do so at 
least once every four years, but gives these bodies the option of election by 
secret ballot or by delegates elected by secret ballot.134 
The statute mandates that in every election required to be held by secret 
ballot, every member in good standing be eligible to be a candidate “subject 
to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed.”135  In Wirtz v. Hotel, 
Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6,136 the Supreme Court held violative 
of section 401(c) a union requirement that candidates for major offices have 
had previous experience on the union’s executive board or assembly or its 
predecessor body.137  Based on the explicit detailed provisions in Title IV 
regulating union elections, the Court opined, “Congress plainly did not intend 
that the authorization in § 401(e) of ‘reasonable qualifications uniformly 
imposed’ should be given a broad reach. . . . The check of democratic elections 
as a preventive measure is seriously impaired by candidacy qualifications 
 
 131. S. Rep. No. 187, at 20 (1959); H.R. Rep. No. 741, at 15–16 (1959). 
 132. S. Rep. No. 187, at 20; see also H.R. Rep. No. 741, at 15–16. 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (2006). 
 134. Id. § 481(a), (d). 
 135. Id. § 481(e).  This provision clearly applies to local unions. See LABOR UNION LAW AND 
REGULATION 233 (William W. Osborne, Jr. et al. eds. 2003).  It is an open question whether it 
applies to internationals and intermediate bodies who elect their officers by conventions of 
delegates rather than secret ballot.  
 136. 391 U.S. 492 (1968). 
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which substantially deplete the ranks of those who might run in opposition to 
incumbents.”138 
 The Court observed that the requirement led to only 1725 of the union’s 
27,000 members being eligible to run for major offices.139  It concluded that, 
“[p]lainly, given the objective of Title IV, a candidacy limitation which renders 
93% of union members ineligible for office can hardly be a ‘reasonable 
qualification.’”140  The Court rejected the union’s justification that, in light of 
the size of the union and its treasury, the requirement reasonably assured that 
principal officers would have prior experience with the local’s affairs.141  The 
Court reasoned that Congress modeled the requirements for union elections on 
political elections and that in both types of elections the voters are presumed 
capable of evaluating candidate qualifications, including prior experience.142 
In Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery,143 the Court 
invalidated a requirement that candidates for local union office have attended 
at least half of the union’s meetings within the three years prior to the 
election.144  The Court found the case controlled by its decision in Hotel 
Employees Local 6 because the record demonstrated that the rule disqualified 
96.5% of the membership.145  The Court rejected the local’s attempts to 
distinguish Hotel Employees Local 6.146  The local argued that, unlike the 
requirement in Local 6, its meeting attendance requirement could be met by 
any member and the requirement did not have an effect of entrenching 
incumbent union officers.147  The Court dismissed the argument that any 
member could qualify by attending the meetings, observing that to attend a 
sufficient number of meetings, a member would have to decide to qualify at 
least 18 months prior to the election, a time when it was unlikely that there 
would be much interest in running for office.148  The Court deemed irrelevant 
the lack of any pattern of entrenched incumbent officers, stating, “Procedures 
that unduly restrict free choice among candidates are forbidden without regard 
to their success or failure in maintaining corrupt leadership.”149 
From these two cases, it appears that in evaluating the reasonableness of a 
qualification for office, the Court will balance the union’s institutional interests 
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served by the rule against the rule’s antidemocratic effects.  In both cases, the 
rule in question was not shown to serve any legitimate union interest, but 
precluded over 90% of the members from candidacy.  Moreover, the 
antidemocratic effects were inherent in the operation of the rules.  The prior 
office-holding requirement made it impossible for most members to qualify, 
while the attendance requirement forced the candidates to decide to run at a 
time when interest in candidacy was likely to be low.  The cases also suggest 
that a rule that entrenches incumbent officers is not likely to survive judicial 
scrutiny, but the absence of a history of such entrenchment will not save an 
otherwise unreasonable requirement.150 
Consideration of whether unions in the United States who adopt FFA-like 
agreements will run afoul of the LMRDA focuses attention on the FFA’s 
provisions concerning the employee advocate.  EAs are not elected by direct 
secret ballot of the membership.151  Applicants are screened by the Fairness 
Committee, which ranks the top three and submits them to the Assistant to the 
CAW President who makes the appointment.152 
As previously noted, the EAs’ duties include providing “support” to 
employees in the lower stages of the Concern Resolution Process, up through 
appeals to Magna’s hotline.  Appeals beyond the hotline are subject to the 
EA’s control, and the EA, rather than the employees, pursues the matter on 
behalf of the employees.153  In performing these duties, the EA would appear 
to be comparable to a traditional union steward or business agent. 
Title IV of the LMRDA only requires the election of “officers.”  Section 
3(n) defines “officer” as “any constitutional officer, any person authorized to 
perform the functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other 
executive functions of a labor organization, and any member of its executive 
board or similar governing body.”154  The definition is a broad one that 
combines “title, function and position.”155  However, business agents, shop 
stewards, and professional staff are considered as performing ministerial duties 
or duties that implement rather than make policy decisions, and therefore, these 
personnel are not considered officers.156 
The EAs, however, do more than act as a steward or business agent.  They 
also comprise the executive committee of the amalgamated Magna local, and 
they elect the local’s officers from among their ranks.157  Consequently, the 
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EAs are clearly officers under the LMRDA and, therefore, the failure of the 
local membership to elect them by direct secret ballot would appear to run 
afoul of Title IV. 
EAs must have three years’ seniority with Magna.158  An important fact in 
determining whether this would be considered a reasonable requirement for a 
union officer under Title IV is the percentage of members that this requirement 
disqualifies.  Although we do not have that information, there is some 
indication that the three-year seniority requirement would be problematic.  
Department of Labor regulations provide that a rule requiring candidates for 
office to have been employed at the trade for a reasonable period of time is 
generally reasonable.159  The regulations do not further define a “reasonable 
period.”160  There is some indication, however, that three years may be too 
long.  Although there is some older authority to the contrary, courts and the 
Department of Labor seem to regard a requirement of continuous good 
standing in the union of more than two years to be unreasonable.161  In any 
event, it appears clear that the Canadian critics of the FFA’s dilution of rank-
and-file control over their representatives would find vindication in the United 
States under the LMRDA. 
B. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it illegal for an employer “to dominate 
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute financial or other support to it.”162  Two key purposes have been 
ascribed to section 8(a)(2): (1) to assure employee freedom of choice and (2) to 
assure that an organization representing employees is independent of their 
employer.  The following subsections explore these purposes and then apply 
section 8(a)(2), in light of these purposes, to the FFA. 
1. Employee Free Choice 
There is general agreement that a purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to assure 
employee free choice.  Employee selection of an exclusive bargaining 
representative should be free of undue employer or union interference or 
coercion.  Preservation of employee free choice was a driving force behind the 
Supreme Court’s decision in International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. 
NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.).163  The union in that case began an 
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organizing campaign among the employer’s production and shipping 
employees.164  During the campaign, some employees went on strike and some 
of the strikers signed cards authorizing the union to act as their exclusive 
bargaining representative.165  The union and employer engaged in negotiations 
with respect to some of the issues involved in the strike.166  On August 30, 
1957, based on a representation from the union that it had secured 
authorization cards from a majority of employees, the parties signed a 
“memorandum of understanding” which provided for employer recognition of 
the union as exclusive bargaining representative, an end to the strike, and 
improvements in wages and working conditions.167  Neither party verified the 
union’s claim of majority status, and it later turned out that the claim was 
erroneous.168  On October 10, 1957, the parties signed a formal collective 
bargaining agreement.169  As of that date, the union did represent a majority of 
the employees.170 
The Supreme Court held that the grant of exclusive recognition to a union 
at a time when it did not have the support of a majority of the employees 
violated the NLRA, even though the parties in good faith believed that, at the 
time of recognition, the union enjoyed majority support.171  It premised its 
holding on the need to protect employee freedom of choice: 
Bernhard-Altmann granted exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected 
by a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the 
nonconsenting majority. There could be no clearer abridgment of § 7 of the 
Act, assuring employees the right ‘to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing’ or ‘to refrain from’ such activity.172 
The Court found it irrelevant that the union had obtained majority support by 
the time the parties signed the formal collective bargaining agreement.  It 
accepted the lower court’s characterization of the situation as “a fait accompli 
depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to choose 
their own representative.”173 
A corollary to the prohibition on recognition of a union lacking in majority 
support is the Board’s long-standing rule that an employer may not recognize a 
union until it has hired a representative complement of its workforce.174  In 
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Majestic Weaving Co.,175 the employer entered into negotiations with the union 
at a time when it had yet to hire a representative complement, with the 
understanding that any resulting contract would depend on the union attaining 
majority support at the appropriate time.176  Twenty-five years earlier, in Julius 
Resnick, Inc.,177 the Board had approved such conditional recognition.  In 
Majestic Weaving, however, the Board considered Julius Resnick inconsistent 
with the Court’s decision in Bernhard-Altman and overruled it.178  On the other 
hand, for decades the Board has approved and enforced provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements whereby the employer agrees both to recognize the 
union at subsequently acquired facilities and to extend the contract’s 
provisions to employees at such facilities upon the union’s presentation of 
authorization cards evidencing its selection by a majority of the employees as 
their exclusive bargaining representative.179  Although most employers actively 
oppose unionization, there is no legal requirement for this opposition. Nor is 
there a legal requirement that they prohibit union organizers from their 
property.  Indeed, cooperation during the organizing drive may legitimately 
prove to be beneficial for both parties.  Yet, employer conduct favoring a union 
may interfere with employee free choice with respect to whether they will 
choose to be represented by the favored union, by another union or by no 
union.  Issues concerning employer “cooperation” with a union seeking to 
organize its workforce are resolved on a case-by-case basis.  The Seventh 
Circuit has catalogued the factors: 
In determining whether management-labor cooperation has crossed over from 
permissible co-operation to unlawful coercion, courts consider a confluence of 
factors, with no one factor being dispositive. This non-exclusive list of factors 
includes whether the employer solicited contact with the union; the rank and 
position of the company’s solicitor; whether the employer silently acquiesced 
in the union’s drive for membership; whether the employer shepherded its 
employees to meetings with a prospective union; whether management was 
present at meetings between its employees and a prospective union; whether 
the signing of union authorization cards was coerced; and whether the 
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employer quickly recognized the assisted union after the employees signed 
authorization cards yet exhibited prejudice against another union selected by 
the employees.180 
Discriminatory treatment favoring an employer’s preferred union, coupled 
with discharging employees for supporting the disfavored union or for refusing 
to sign cards for the favored union, clearly violates section 8(a)(2) of the 
Act.181  So too does a supervisor’s direction to employees to sign cards for the 
favored union182 and granting access to the favored union while denying access 
to its rival.183  Not all section 8(a)(2) violations are so blatant.  Violations have 
been found where a manager, after introducing a union representative, 
remained in the room while the employees signed, or chose not to sign, 
authorization cards;184 and where a manager introduced an employee he had 
reason to know supported a rival union to an organizer from the favored union 
and indicated the employer’s preference for the favored union.185 
Even a disclaimer that the choice of representative is up to the employee 
may be insufficient to avoid a section 8(a)(2) violation.  In NLRB v. Keller 
Ladders Southern, Inc.,186 a manager solicited two employees to assist a union 
organizer in collecting authorization cards.187  The selected employees and 
organizer, with the manager’s permission, called a meeting of employees 
during a coffee break.188  The manager introduced the organizer, stated that he 
knew a union would eventually want to organize the employees and that he 
would not resist unionization, but the employees could do whatever they 
wanted.189  He then left the room.190  The court, relying on the employer’s 
designation of two employees to solicit their coworkers to sign cards without 
the coworkers’ knowledge of the designation, found a section 8(a)(2) 
violation.191 
On the other hand, the Board has approved employer conduct which 
generally may be thought of as assisting a union in an organizing drive.  A 
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leading case is Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc.192  In Coamo, a meeting took place 
on company property and, for a few employees, on company time.193 At the 
meeting, a manager introduced a union representative who addressed the 
employees and distributed authorization cards.194  Another manager was 
present for the card distribution and signings but was not in a position to see 
which employees, if any, signed cards and which declined.195  The Board, 
relying on the manager’s inability to observe which employees signed cards 
and on evidence that management made no attempt to find out which 
employees attended the meeting, held that there was no section 8(a)(2) 
violation.196 
The Board’s approach has not been unanimous.  In Longchamps, Inc.,197 
the Board found no section 8(a)(2) violation when, shortly after hiring its 
workforce in anticipation of the opening of its new restaurant, the employer 
called an employee meeting to introduce supervisors and explain customer 
service and operating policies.198  At the end of the meeting, the restaurant 
manager introduced two union representatives, turned the meeting over to 
them, and, with the supervisors, left the room.199  The union representatives 
solicited the employees to sign authorization cards.200  At another point, the 
manager or a supervisor directed four kitchen employees to leave their work 
stations and go to the dining room where union representatives met them and 
solicited them to sign cards.201  The Board found no section 8(a)(2) violation, 
but then Chairman Edward Miller dissented, challenging the fine lines the 
Board had drawn between lawful cooperation and illegal coercion: 
It is difficult to see much practical difference, so far as the effect on employees 
is concerned, between direct supervisory solicitation of authorization cards and 
company blessed solicitation by a union organizer on company time and 
property of such signatures, especially in an atmosphere where the employer, 
by word ordered, indicates that he approves of and supports the efforts of the 
organizer and thereafter grants voluntary recognition on the basis of signatures 
thus obtained.202 
Section 8(c) of the NLRA provides: “The expressing of any views, 
argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, 
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graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor 
practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise 
of benefit.”203 
The statutory guarantee of free speech has itself led to some fine line 
drawing.204  Whereas an employer directive to sign an authorization card 
violates section 8(a)(2),205 in Coamo, the Board found the following speech 
lawful because it contained no promise of benefit or threat of reprisal: 
  There are a number of benefits to us all from the merger—steadier 
employment and greater availability of capital for new equipment.  There are 
also certain obligations.  One of these is the requirement that we sign a 
contract with the [ILGWU] if you want the Union.  Our parent company, 
Bobbie Brooks, has had contractual dealings with this Union for twenty-three 
years.  During this time, it has grown from a few thousand dollars to a 
company with sales of seventy-five million—so the Union could not have been 
too much of a handicap.  Seriously, the ILGWU has shown itself to be a 
responsible and intelligent Union, and we anticipate no problems if we deal 
with them. 
  During the next few days, representatives of the Union will be in Coamo to 
solicit your membership.  Although you are under no compulsion, we urge you 
to join.  The Company will negotiate a contract with the Union, which we 
believe will be mutually beneficial.206 
In essence, the fine line drawing with respect to employer pro-union speech is 
no different than the fine line drawing that takes place with respect to employer 
anti-union speech.  In each case, statements which convey the same substantive 
message may fall on one or the other side of the line depending on how they 
are worded and the context in which they are uttered.207 
2. Worker Representative Independence 
In NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,208 the employer 
had an employee representation plan which, in its most recent form, provided 
for an Employee Representative Committee composed entirely of employees 
elected by their peers.209  But the plan provided that any amendments to it 
could be disapproved by the employer within fifteen days.210  The employer’s 
ability to veto changes in the representation plan was sufficient for the Court to 
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declare the plan an illegal employer-dominated labor organization.  The Court 
reasoned, “The plan may not be amended if the company disapproves the 
amendment.  Such control of the form and structure of an employe 
organization deprives the employes of the complete freedom of action 
guaranteed to them by the Act, and justifies an order such as was here 
entered.”211 
To the Court, the key defect in the plan was the absence of employee 
independence due to the employer’s retention of the right to veto changes in 
plan structure.  That the employer had never exercised its veto power to 
interfere with plan structure was immaterial—the power alone was sufficient to 
condemn the arrangement.212 
 The requirement of bargaining representative independence also restricts 
the role that supervisors and managers who remain members of the union may 
play in the union’s affairs.  In its landmark decision in Nassau & Suffolk 
County Contractors Association,213 the Board held that for managers who 
remain members of the union but are not in a bargaining unit represented by 
the union to vote in union elections: 
is plainly a form of interference with the administration of a labor 
organization.  It may not be unlawful for company executives and high-ranking 
supervisors to retain the union membership they acquired as rank-and-file 
employees as job insurance in the event they should revert to ordinary 
employee status, but that does not make it lawful for them to participate in 
elections to determine who is to administer the affairs of the union.214 
The Board allowed first line supervisors who were also members of the 
bargaining unit to participate in union meetings and elections.215  The Board, 
however, held that the employer interfered in the administration of the union, 
in violation of section 8(a)(2), by acquiescing in the supervisors’ participation 
on the union’s bargaining team.216  The Board reasoned: 
Despite the large measure of control exercised over master mechanics by the 
Union, the mechanics remain in part agents of their employers with a resulting 
divided loyalty and interests . . . . Employees have the right to be represented 
in collective-bargaining negotiations by individuals who have a single-minded 
loyalty to their interests.  Conversely, an employer is under a duty to refrain 
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from any action which will interfere with that employee right and place him 
even in slight degree on both sides of the bargaining table.217 
The requirement of bargaining representative independence is critical to 
the overall scheme of the NLRA.  Although some have argued that the NLRA 
was a piece of radical legislation which has been undermined by the Board and 
the courts,218 when viewed in its historical context, the statute was really quite 
conservative.  The NLRA came out of the Great Depression and was part of a 
broader scheme to more equitably distribute wealth and income, thereby 
spurring demand for goods and services and inoculating the economy against 
another depression.  Thus, section 1 of the NLRA declares, inter alia: 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess 
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are 
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association 
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing 
power of wage earners in industry . . . .219 
In pursuing the goal of more equitable wage rates and working conditions, 
Congress faced a choice.  It could have opted for more radical intervention 
with the government dictating specific terms and conditions of employment.  
Instead, through the NLRA, it took the more conservative approach of 
providing workers with a mechanism of self-organization to equalize 
bargaining power and then leaving the setting of specific terms of employment 
to private negotiation and self-ordering.220  Worker representation 
independence of the employer is crucial to the legislative scheme of equalizing 
bargaining power and private ordering.221  Professor Kohler has eloquently 
explained why: 
Absent the economic strength self-association provides individual employees, 
the employer typically is free, both de facto and de jure, either to promulgate 
and administer the terms governing the employment relationship unilaterally, 
or to do so only with such employee participation as it chooses to allow, and 
within the limits that it singly establishes.  Hence, employee organization into 
self-controlled, autonomous groups through the exercise of their basic 
associational rights is central to the collective bargaining scheme: it is through 
this association that workers are afforded the means to voice and protect their 
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own interests and, thereby, to achieve effective participation in the ordering, 
i.e., the private lawmaking process.222 
A number of circuit courts of appeals decisions, however, have shifted the 
focus from the employer’s authority to control the labor organization to 
whether it has actually exercised that authority to dominate the entity.223  As 
then-Board Member Raudabaugh observed in his concurring opinion in 
Electromation, Inc.,224 most of these decisions fail to even cite, much less 
discuss the precedential authority of Newport News.225 
Most troubling is the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Homemaker Shops.226  At 
issue was a representation committee comprised of one representative elected 
by secret ballot from each of the employer’s stores.227  Representatives served 
one-year terms.228  The committee structure and election procedures were 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement.229  Consequently, employer 
consent was necessary to change them, and the employer twice vetoed 
proposed changes in the terms of office and electoral system.230 
The employer’s authority over the committee’s structure, terms of office, 
and system for electing representatives would seem to place the Homemaker 
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system squarely under the control of Newport News.  The Sixth Circuit, 
however, would not allow a Supreme Court decision directly on point to deter 
it from giving its blessing to a representation plan it liked.  Citing a student law 
review note for authority, the court characterized Newport News as providing 
“a rigid rule . . . [that] runs contrary to more recent trends—the decline of the 
notorious ‘company unions,’ the change in public policy from nurturing the 
nascent labor movement to regulating and limiting management and labor 
excesses alike, and the change in employee attitudes to employer-employee 
relations.”231  The court then chose simply to ignore the Supreme Court 
precedent. 
In his Electromation concurrence, Member Raudabaugh offered an 
alternative analysis to undermine the authority of Newport News.232  He opined 
that the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA impliedly overruled 
Newport News.233  In Member Raudabaugh’s opinion, the Taft-Hartley Act 
undermined what he considered the adversarial approach to section 8(a)(2) by 
shifting government’s position from promoting collective bargaining to 
neutrality, protecting employee choice, and encouraging peaceful resolution of 
workplace disputes over adversarial strife.234 
Member Raudabaugh’s view misreads the Taft-Hartley amendments.  It is 
significant that the Taft-Hartley Act did not amend section 8(a)(2).  It did 
represent a congressional backlash against organized labor premised on the 
view that labor had become too powerful.235  Its remedy of adding union unfair 
labor practices and an employee right to refrain from concerted activities was 
designed not to do away with requirements of representative independence for 
participation in privately ordering the workplace, but to rebalance the power of 
labor and management to ensure the continued working of that private 
ordering.236  Indeed, the deepest recession since the Great Depression has again 
raised the question of whether the balance need be adjusted one more time.  
Debate over the proposed Employee Free Choice Act has recently focused on 
whether the decline in union density has eroded labor standards to the point 
where worker purchasing power no longer provides an inoculation against 
economic turmoil.237  In any event, it is not surprising that, without attributing 
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it to Member Raudabaugh by name, the Seventh Circuit, in enforcing the 
Board’s order in Electromation, rejected his Taft-Hartley Act analysis.238 
The current state of the law concerning a requirement that an employee 
representative be truly independent of the employer can only be described as 
confused.  As seen in the next section, how that confusion is resolved affects 
the legality of certain provisions of the FFA under American law. 
3. The FFA and Section 8(a)(2) 
As characterized by CAW economist Jim Stanford, the FFA represents a 
“corporatist type of strategy” to representing workers.239  Under the FFA, the 
CAW commits to serving as a check and balance within the Magna human 
resources system.240  The FFA clearly takes as a given Magna’s existing 
policies which encourage worker identification with their local plants and 
management. Because of this, the FFA has been criticized for undermining 
worker solidarity.  Regardless of the merits of such criticism, the embarkation 
on a corporatist approach to representing workers would not per se violate 
section 8(a)(2).  Section 8(a)(2) mandates only that the labor organization 
representing the workers be independent from the employer; it does not 
mandate adversarial labor relations.  Indeed, inferring a mandate of an 
adversarial struggle would be inconsistent with the private ordering that is at 
the heart of the NLRA approach to establishing terms and conditions of 
employment.  Unlike some in-house committees which are financially 
dependent on the employer who provides meeting space, supplies, and clerical 
support and allows committees to meet on employer time, the CAW has an 
independent financial base and its own professional staff and expertise. 
In exchange for opting into the Magna corporatist system, the CAW 
received some significant advantages that it would not have had if it relied on 
established law in organizing.  These advantages include access to a list of 
employees at a targeted facility, the ability to meet with employees on the 
employer’s property for one week during non-working time in non-working 
areas, and the joint meeting with management and the employees just prior to 
the election at which union and employer representatives present their 
commitment to working together toward the facility’s growth and success and 
their commitment to the FFA and the national collective bargaining 
agreement.241  Cases such as Coamo Knitting Mills establish that these 
advantages fall on the cooperation side of the line between cooperation and 
coercion.242  Indeed, the granting of access would appear to be an exercise of 
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fundamental employer property rights.  Just as an employer has a right to 
exclude nonemployee union organizers from its property,243 it has a right to 
invite them onto its property.  In either case, the right may not be exercised in a 
manner that discriminates on the basis of section 7-protected activity, but there 
are no reports that other unions or employees opposed to unionization have 
sought similar access from Magna. 
The content of the joint presentation to the employees at the meeting 
conducted on employer time just prior to the election would also appear to be 
lawful.  As previously discussed, section 8(c) requires drawing a fine line 
between lawful, albeit pro-union, employer speech and unlawful coercion.244  
The statements as set forth in the FFA would appear to fall on the lawful side 
of the line. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the FFA is its waiver of the right 
to strike and substitution of arbitration to resolve bargaining impasses.  
Regardless of one’s views on the desirability of interest arbitration,245 an 
agreement to substitute arbitration for economic warfare does not leave the 
union at the mercy of the employer.  The union retains bargaining leverage, 
and CAW economist Stanford argues that it gained increased leverage.246  In 
any event, unions enjoy broad discretion in deciding how best to represent 
employees in collective bargaining, and a decision to substitute arbitration for 
strikes and strike threats certainly falls within that wide range of 
reasonableness where courts defer to union decision-making.247 
Several aspects of the FFA, however, are problematic under section 
8(a)(2).  First is the timing of the joint meeting on company time at which 
union and employer representatives affirm their commitments to the FFA, the 
national agreement, and working together.248  It occurs just prior to the 
election.249  In Peerless Plywood Co.,250 the NLRB held that a mass 
presentation on company time within twenty-four hours of a representation 
election would render the election vulnerable to being invalidated upon the 
filing of post-election objections.251  The Board reasoned that “last-minute 
speeches by either employers or unions delivered to massed assemblies of 
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employees on company time have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and 
tend to interfere with that sober and thoughtful choice which a free election is 
designed to reflect.”252  The Board expressed concern over the last-minute 
nature of such speeches coupled with their mass psychology.253  It concluded 
that mass addresses on company time within twenty-four hours of an election 
“tend to destroy freedom of choice and establish an atmosphere in which a free 
election cannot be held.”254 
The line between lawful employer cooperation and employer support 
violative of section 8(a)(2) turns on whether the conduct at issue interferes 
with employee freedom of choice.255  The joint presentation on company time 
by union and management representatives just prior to the election poses a 
more substantial threat to employee free choice than the single party captive 
audience speech within twenty-four hours of the election.  When an employer 
gives a captive audience speech, it does so in the face of the union’s organized 
opposition to its position.  Although the union does not have a right to respond 
on company time,256 it will still try to reach as many workers as possible to 
respond.  Where the union and employer make a joint presentation as under the 
FFA, there is no organized opposition to respond.  Making the joint 
presentation just prior to the election precludes employees from discussing and 
reflecting on its content and evaluating whether a vote for union recognition is 
in their interests.  The timing of the joint presentation crosses the line from 
lawful cooperation to interference with employee free choice and thus 
constitutes unlawful employer support in violation of section 8(a)(2). 
A second problematic feature of the FFA is its combining the vote to ratify 
the national agreement with the vote for recognition in a single ballot.257  In 
effect, this process amounts to a type of conditional recognition condemned in 
Majestic Weaving.258  The agreement is negotiated before the vote and, thus, 
before any evidence is obtained that the union has been selected by a majority 
of the employees.  By voting to ratify the agreement, the employees are voting 
to be represented by the union.  In effect, the employer has recognized the 
union and agreed to terms conditioned on the employees’ favorable vote. 
One might argue that the FFA is analogous to after-acquired-facilities 
clauses which the Board has long upheld.  Such an analogy would be flawed.  
Like the terms of the collective bargaining agreements applied to new facilities 
under after-acquired-facilities clauses, the terms of the CAW-Magna national 
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agreement appear to have been negotiated at arm’s length.  The CAW already 
represented employees at three Magna facilities when the terms were 
negotiated.  Yet, the contract covering employees at newly organized facilities 
is different from the contract covering the facilities that had already been 
organized.  It was negotiated specifically for the facilities that would be 
organized in the future.  Its taking effect anywhere was conditioned on the 
employees somewhere voting for CAW representation.259  The FFA is much 
more like conditional recognition than after-acquired facilities provisions. 
The actual election at Windsor Modules demonstrates how such 
conditional recognition can interfere with employee free choice.  The contract 
granted production workers an immediate $3.00 per hour raise, retroactive to 
two months earlier, with further raises of $0.50 at six months and one year of 
service.260  It granted skilled trades employees a retroactive payment of $1000 
and raises of $0.50 per hour at six months of service and one year of service.261  
The CAW leadership’s PowerPoint presentation to the CAW Council 
acknowledged the impact of this conditional recognition on the results at 
Windsor Modules: 
 Everyone got an immediate $3 per hour wage increase. Future wage increases 
are also specified. Plus there will be an automatic annual adjustment based on 
the trend in consumer prices. That’s something we don’t have at many existing 
CAW bargaining units. . . .  Additional wage increases will also be paid based 
on plant-level performance. 
 Those increases are built right into the base wage rate—not paid out as one-
time bonuses, as is currently the practice. . . These are important economic 
gains. Incremental progress. Progress that will improve the lives of our new 
members.  No wonder they voted 87% for the union.262 
It has long been established, however, that a grant of benefits for the 
purpose of influencing employees’ exercise of the right to self-organization is 
coercive and illegal.263  Combining contract ratification and recognition in the 
same vote has the same effect, and in the United States, would constitute 
illegal employer support of a labor organization in violation of section 
8(a)(2).264 
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Finally, we must consider the effect of the FFA on the CAW’s 
independence.  We have already seen that the provision for appointment of the 
EAs, would, if applied in the United States, violate the requirement of Title IV 
of the LMRDA that local union members elect their officers by direct secret 
ballot vote.265  The LMRDA’s mandate of local union democracy helps ensure 
that the union will operate independently of the employer in representing the 
workers.  Yet, if the CAW wanted to correct the method of selecting the EAs 
to comply with the LMRDA, it could not do so without Magna’s consent. 
The FFA provides: 
The parties agree that the fundamental principles set out in this FFA and any 
supplemental agreements, letters or memoranda (the “Supplements”), shall not 
be changed through future negotiation, arbitration nor shall such principles be 
the basis for any labour action.  Any changes to the FFA or the Supplements 
shall only be made through mutual agreement between the parties.266 
The FFA specifies that all Magna facilities at which the CAW is 
recognized form a single amalgamated CAW local.267  It also specifies how the 
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recognizing the shop committee.  The ALJ concluded that the vote did not establish that a 
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit desired representation by the shop committee. 
See Autodie Int’l. Inc.v. Int’l. Union, 321 N.L.R.B. 688–91 (1996).  An Advice Memorandum 
issued by the NLRB General Counsel on January 4, 2005, reads Komatz and Autodie for the 
proposition that an employer violates § 8(a)(2) if it voluntarily recognizes a union which, in a 
private election, receives the votes of a majority of the voters but not a majority of the bargaining 
unit.  Whittier Hosp. Med. Ctr. No. 21-CA-36404 (NLRB GC Div of Advice, Jan. 4, 2005).  If 
the Board were to concur with the advice memorandum, the FFA provision for recognition upon 
receipt of a vote of the majority of voters rather than a majority of employees in the bargaining 
unit would be considered illegal. 
 265. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text. 
 266. FFA, supra note 1, at 13. 
 267. Id. at 6. 
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officers of the local will be selected and how the EAs who represent the 
bargaining unit members at the facility level will be selected, including 
required qualifications.268  None of these significant matters of internal union 
governance may be changed without agreement from Magna.269 
Such employer control over a union’s internal operations would appear to 
fall squarely within section 8(a)(2)’s prohibition on employer interference with 
the administration of a labor organization.270  It also falls squarely within the 
holding of Newport News that a union whose changes to internal structure may 
be vetoed by an employer is an employer-dominated labor organization.271 
As developed earlier, however, a few circuit courts of appeals have 
disregarded the precedent established in Newport News.  These courts require a 
showing of actual domination by the employer to sustain a finding of a section 
8(a)(2) violation.  Mere possession of the power to dominate is insufficient.272  
Under these courts’ analyses, the Magna power to veto changes in the internal 
administration of the amalgamated local would probably be held lawful.  It is 
highly unlikely that a court would find actual domination of the CAW, the 
largest private sector union in Canada. 
The FFA, however, illustrates why the courts that have ignored Newport 
News are mistaken.  In defending the local union structure and method of 
selecting the EAs, CAW leadership has acknowledged that the “indirect 
election” is uncommon but has urged that it is not unprecedented in Canada.273  
CAW leadership maintains that the EAs will be strong union advocates and 
points out that the national CAW staff will also service the Magna bargaining 
units.274  CAW leadership, however, has never defended Magna’s retention of 
the power to veto changes to the union’s internal structure and processes; nor 
could it.  No party has ever suggested any legitimate business purpose served 
by Magna’s retention of such power.  An agreement which empowers an 
employer to intrude on the autonomy of the exclusive bargaining 
representative by having a say in its internal structure and process for selecting 
its leaders should be supported by a very strong legitimate business purpose for 
it to be lawful.275 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 8. 
 270. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006). 
 271. NLRB v. Newport News, 308 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1939). 
 272. See supra notes 223–31 and accompanying text. 
 273. CAW FFA PowerPoint, supra note 10, at 19. 
 274. Id. at 16. 
 275. Some have argued that the requirement of labor organization independence from the 
employer is anachronistic in light of fundamentally changed global economic circumstances.  See, 
e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor 
Organization under Section (8)(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1653–56 (1999).  
Such arguments have come close to but not succeeded in changing the law.  In 1997, Congress 
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To recap, the combined vision of Title IV of the LMRDA and section 
8(a)(2) of the NLRA is one of employees represented by an autonomous labor 
organization that is independent of employer control, that they have freely 
chosen as their representative and that they control through direct democratic 
elections.  Against this standard, the FFA fails to measure up.  Consequently, 
were it implemented in the United States, it should be declared unlawful. 
III.  LESSONS FROM THE FFA EXERCISE 
Although there are no reports of FFA-like agreements adopted in the 
United States, the use of neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements has 
become the most favored method of organizing by American unions.276  With 
increased use has come increased resistance.  Conservative Republicans in 
Congress have introduced legislation that would ban voluntary recognition.277  
In 2007, the National Labor Relations Board, populated by appointees of 
President Bush, overruled more than forty years of precedent that held a 
voluntary recognition would not bar a petition to decertify the newly-
recognized union nor would a contract negotiated by the union bar a 
representation petition unless the parties first posted a notice advising 
employees that they have forty-five days to file a decertification petition with 
the NLRB.278 
Neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements in the United States do 
not implicate Title IV of the LMRDA.  The analysis of the FFA under section 
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, however, can provide useful insight into the legality of 
neutrality and voluntary recognition agreements used in the United States.  As 
demonstrated above, the primary concerns of section 8(a)(2) are ensuring 
bargaining representative independence from the employer and employee free 
choice.279  Under this standard, most features of neutrality and voluntary 
recognition agreements are clearly lawful.  As discussed in the context of the 
 
passed the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997 (TEAM ACT), which would 
have amended section 8(a)(2) to allow employers to “establish, assist, maintain, or participate” in 
organizations “in which employees participate . . . to address matters” of mutual interest which do 
not “have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements.”  
H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997).  President Clinton vetoed the TEAM 
Act and Congress failed to override his veto.  Even the TEAM Act would have continued the 
requirement of independence for a labor organization that sought to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements. 
 276. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects 
for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 847 (2005). 
 277. Secret Ballot Protection Act, H.R. 4343, 110th Cong. (2004); Secret Ballot Protection 
Act, S. 2637, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 278. Dana Corp. & Metaldyne Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 434–35 (2007).  The election of 
President Obama probably means an end to the Board’s assault on voluntary recognition. 
 279. See supra Part II.B. 
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FFA, employers are free to exercise their property rights by granting unions 
access to employees on the premises as long as they do not discriminate in 
doing so.280 Their free speech rights under section 8(c) allow them to make 
presentations favorable to a union as long as they do not cross the line into 
active coercion.281  And if employers have free speech rights to speak 
favorably about unions, they certainly have free speech rights to remain silent 
(i.e. to maintain a stance of neutrality). 
An issue pending before the Board is the legality of an agreement 
establishing a framework for collective bargaining in the event of voluntary 
recognition.282  The issue arises out of unfair labor practice charges filed 
against Dana Corporation.283  The UAW’s agreement with Dana provided for 
employer neutrality and union access to nonworking areas of the plant.284  It 
provided that in no event would bargaining erode healthcare “solutions and 
concepts” that were scheduled to be implemented on January 1, 2004, 
including premium sharing, deductibles, and out of pocket maximums.285  It 
also committed that any collective bargaining agreement would be of at least 
four years in duration and that the parties would resort to interest arbitration if 
they could not reach an agreement.286 
The agreement also specified subjects that must be included in any 
contract, including: flexible compensation, minimum classifications, team-
based approaches, and mandatory overtime.287  The agreement divided the 
Dana facilities into three levels, and further divided level 1 facilities, such as 
those which manufactured products for General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, 
into two phases.288  The UAW agreed that it would initially only organize level 
1, phase 1 facilities and would not organize more than seven at one time.289  
The agreement created a “national partnership steering committee,” with an 
equal number of members from the union and the company.290  The UAW 
agreed that it would not organize beyond level 1, phase 1 facilities unless a 
majority of the steering committee agreed that the overall impact of the 
collective bargaining agreements had not “materially harmed . . . financial 
 
 280. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text. 
 282. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005). 
 283. Id. at 2. 
 284. Id. at 3–4. 
 285. Id. at 4. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005). 
 288. Id. at 5 n.5. 
 289. Id. at 5. 
 290. Id. 
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performance.”291  If the committee deadlocked, the dispute was to be submitted 
for third party resolution.292 
After a hearing, an NLRB administrative law judge dismissed the section 
8(a)(1) and (2) charges that had been filed against Dana and section 8(b)(1)(A) 
charges that had been filed against the UAW.293  He ruled that the NLRB 
General Counsel’s theory that the framework agreement amounted to unlawful 
recognition of the UAW by Dana at a time when the UAW did not have 
majority support was not properly pled in the complaint.294  The administrative 
law judge also considered the merits of the complaint as an alternative basis for 
dismissal.  He concluded that Dana had not recognized the UAW, either 
expressly or by implication: 
There is no evidence that Dana deals with the UAW concerning employee 
grievances. Importantly, Dana remains free to make changes in terms and 
conditions of employees without first notifying and on request bargaining with 
the UAW. This is utterly at odds with the notion that Dana has recognized the 
UAW. There is no concept of partial recognition in labor law; there is either 
recognition or there is not. Nor can it be said that the letter of agreement 
constitutes a collective bargaining agreement from which recognition can be 
inferred. The letter of agreement does not deal with significant matters such as 
wages, pensions, grievances and arbitration, vacations, union security, etc.295 
The administrative law judge distinguished Majestic Weaving on the 
grounds that Majestic Weaving involved conditional recognition, whereas the 
Dana case did not involve recognition at all.  In addition, the contract 
negotiated in Majestic Weaving was more complete than the framework 
agreement in Dana.296  Review of the administrative law judge’s decision is 
pending before the Board. 
Analysis of the FFA revealed two primary concerns that underlie section 
8(a)(2): employee free choice and labor organization independence.297  This 
same framework can be used to analyze the UAW-Dana and similar 
framework agreements. 
The administrative law judge’s analysis of the framework agreement is 
appropriate but insufficient.  The administrative law judge’s focus on the 
framework agreement’s vagueness and failure to address most significant 
subjects of bargaining recognizes that the framework agreement cannot be 
characterized as a fait accompli of recognition that would overcome 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005). 
 293. Id. at 7–10. 
 294. Id. at 6–7. 
 295. Id. at 7–8. 
 296. Id. at 8. 
 297. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the objective of employee freedom of choice); supra 
Part II.B.2 (discussing the objective of worker representative independence). 
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employees’ free choice in deciding whether to sign cards authorizing the UAW 
to serve as their exclusive bargaining representative.  Other aspects of the 
framework agreement, however, also bear on whether it undermines employee 
free choice.  Significantly, unlike the CAW-Magna Windsor Modules 
agreement, the UAW-Dana framework agreement does not promise any 
improvement in wages or benefits to employees for opting for UAW 
representation.  It does commit to concepts such as premium sharing, 
deductibles, and out-of-pocket maximums that have become so common in 
health insurance that one would expect to find them in any newly organized 
bargaining unit’s contract.298  It also commits vaguely to flexible 
compensation, team-based approaches, minimum classifications, and 
mandatory overtime.299  None of these commitments can be said to be 
promises of benefits.  Here too, the framework agreement does not seem to 
undermine employee freedom of choice. 
When the agreement was reached, Dana issued a press release announcing 
it, but the parties agreed to keep the terms confidential, so the terms were not 
disclosed.300  The General Counsel argued that the confidentiality agreement 
communicated to employees that the UAW had a special insider relationship 
with Dana and implied that Dana had already recognized the union.301  The 
administrative law judge rejected this contention as outside the scope of the 
complaint.302  The administrative law judge further opined: 
Dana and the UAW publicly announced the existence of the letter of 
agreement even if they did not reveal its precise terms. By now all employees 
who are interested will know of the specific terms of the letter of agreement. 
Employees are free [to] make what they will of the letter of agreement in 
deciding whether or not to support union representation.303 
Availability of information concerning the existence of the agreement and 
its general terms is important to employees in order to protect employee free 
choice.  In the agreement, the UAW committed to what CAW economist Jim 
Stanford called a corporatist type approach to collective representation.304  
Knowledge of that commitment would be very relevant to an employee’s 
decision to opt for or oppose UAW representation.  Employees might prefer 
representation by a labor organization that takes a more traditional adversarial 
 
 298. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005). 
 299. Id. at 5–6. 
 300. Press Release, Dana Corporation, Dana Corporation Announces Settlements with USW 
and UAW Agreement with Centerbridge Capital Partners on Major Investment in Dana (July 6, 
2005), available at http://dana.mediaroom.com/index.php/press_releases/2118?printable. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 7. 
 303. Id. 
 304. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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approach, or they might simply feel that a corporatist representation approach 
does not add sufficient value to justify union dues and other costs.  
Transparency in such private deals is necessary to preserve employee free 
choice. 
Apart from its impact on employee free choice, the agreement must be 
evaluated for its impact on bargaining representative independence.  Unlike the 
FFA, the UAW-Dana agreement gives Dana no say in the internal structure of 
the locals representing Dana employees or in how they select their 
leadership.305  The agreement commits the UAW to a cooperative, corporatist 
approach to collective bargaining, but within that general framework, leaves 
considerable room for negotiation of specific terms.  If the employees freely 
opt for a cooperative, corporatist approach to representation, the UAW’s 
commitment to such an approach would not seem to restrict its independence 
to the point where the agreement could be characterized as employer 
interference in the administration of a labor organization.  Here too, the key to 
legality is transparency. 
One aspect of the UAW-Dana agreement that the administrative law judge 
did not rule on was the restrictions it placed on the UAW’s organizing.306  
Such restrictions do not raise issues of employee free choice as employees 
have no right to compel an unwilling union to serve as their exclusive 
representative.  They do, however, raise questions of bargaining representative 
independence. 
The UAW-Dana agreement applies only to Dana facilities that supply the 
“Detroit Three,” facilities labeled level 1.307  It does not appear that the 
agreement bars the UAW from organizing other Dana facilities. It merely 
means that such organizing would occur without the access and neutrality 
advantages provided for in the agreement.  With respect to level 1 facilities, the 
agreement precludes the UAW from organizing those categorized as phase 2 
facilities unless a joint labor-management committee determines that the 
overall impact of collective bargaining has not harmed the company’s financial 
performance.308  If the committee deadlocks, the issue is submitted to a neutral 
third party for resolution.309  As a practical matter, because the union appoints 
half of the committee members, the union has the power to deadlock the 
committee and force the issue to third party resolution.  Thus, restraints on the 
union’s organizing phase 2 facilities are ultimately determined by the third 
party neutral, not by Dana.  In other words, Dana does not have the power to 
 
 305. Compare FFA supra note 1, compare with UAW-Dana Agreement supra Press Release  
note 301. 
 306. Dana Corp., 7-CA-46965 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005). 
 307. Id. at 5 n.3. 
 308. Id. at 5. 
 309. Id. 
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veto the UAW’s organizing activity.  Under these circumstances, it would not 
appear that this aspect of the agreement so restricts the union’s independence 
as to render it an unlawful interference in the administration of a labor 
organization.310 
CONCLUSION 
The landmark Framework of Fairness Agreement between the CAW and 
Magna International represents the CAW’s response to declining union density 
in the Canadian private sector.  The agreement, however, has generated 
considerable controversy in Canada because of its substitution of interest 
arbitration for the right to strike and doing away with traditional trappings of 
union representation such as traditional grievance procedures and directly 
elected show stewards and local officers.  In the United States, Title IV of the 
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and section 8(a)(2) of the 
National Labor Relations Act together envision employees represented by 
labor organizations they have freely chosen, that are independent of their 
employers and that they control through direct democratic processes.  Were the 
FFA adopted in the United States, it would not measure up to these standards 
and would likely be found to violate both statutes. 
Unions in the United States have come to rely increasingly on private 
agreements providing for employer neutrality, union access to employees on 
employer property, and voluntary recognition when organizing employees.  
Such agreements have been controversial both with respect to the premise that 
parties can contract out of NLRB representation procedures and with respect to 
what unions have agreed to in return for these organizing advantages.  
Although such agreements are unlikely to implicate the LMRDA, they have 
been challenged under section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.  The evaluation of the 
FFA from the standpoint of effect on employee free choice and effect on labor 
organization independence provides a useful vehicle for analyzing the legality 
of these private agreements. 
  
 
 310. The Dana-UAW agreement is in marked contrast to other agreements reported in the 
media.  For example, it has been reported that the Service Employees International Union has 
entered into secret agreements with certain employers whereby, in exchange for employer 
neutrality and card check recognition at some locations, SEIU has promised not to organize 
employees at other locations.  It has been alleged that SEIU abandoned an organizing drive 
among security guards employed by Allied Barton Security Services at Temple University and 
the University of Pennsylvania in exchange for the company’s agreement to neutrality and card 
check in Boston, Los Angeles, Washington and Seattle.  See Jane M. Von Bergen, For Union, 
Pragmatism vs. Principle: SEIU is Active in 1 Recruiting Drive in Phila., but Abandoned 
Another, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 27, 2008, at B1.  Such secret deals that enable an 
employer to, in effect, veto where a union will organize, do raise substantial issues about labor 
organization independence and are of questionable legality. 
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